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ABSTRACT
Theoretically, Sharīʿa is meant to be an applicable methodology of jurisprudence that
governs the state legal system. Applying Sharīʿa, or calling for its application, is, further, a 
must for those who believe in its divinity. In the process of democratic transition in Egypt, 
Islamists proposed applying Sharīʿa, claiming that its mere application provides accurate 
solutions for the chronic problems Egypt has long been suffering from. However, the 
obligatory nature of applying Sharīʿa and its positive impact on the community’s total 
welfare are not absolute paradigms. The conditions of the society in which applying Sharīʿa 
is proposed should be thoroughly recognized. As with any legal system, attaining the 
positive outcomes of applying Sharīʿa depends on the extension to which law is dominant in 
society. And since “law” does not “rule” in Egypt, at least in the formal liberal sense of the 
term, then neither applying Sharīʿa nor any other methodology would diffuse its underlying 
ideology. Therefore, this thesis examines the promises and limitations of applying Sharīʿa in 
post-revolutionary Egypt, on both the theoretical and practical levels, and highlights the 
major factors that neutralized the rule of law in Egypt so far thereby undermining the claims
of applying Sharīʿa today.
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I. Introduction:
Just last June, 2012, Amnesty International called on President Morsi to put Egypt on the right 
path towards the rule of law.1 Analysts then argued that Morsi’s latest reforms, which included 
ousting the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) on the one hand, and appointing the Mekky 
brothers in key positions on the other,2 provide hope that Egypt is on this right track.3 However, 
others see these latest measures as an attempt to monopolize power, paving the way towards a 
totalitarian rule by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).4 And so, democratic transition is never a simple 
task, and such has been the case in Egypt. One vital aspect of democratization is establishing the 
rule of law. General Assembly Resolution 61/39 highlights that “the rule of law and democracy are 
interlinked and mutually reinforcing.”5
Towards a new Egypt that is ruled by law, the MB claims that they are seeking to apply Sharīʿa, a 
reformation that is claimed to have the effect of reshaping the basic system of the state. Generally, 
such suggestion of establishing the State on the basis of Sharīʿa is usually met with either secularists’ 
blind rejection or Islamists’ full acceptance. The situation in Egypt is even more acute as applying 
Shariʿa has become almost a public demand. From the viewpoint of various contemporary Islamists, 
any isolation of religion is viewed as secularism which marginalizes religion and excludes its 
methodology.6 Those Islamists consider every disengagement of religion as secularism or even 
atheism and, therefore, demand the full application of Sharīʿa. 
                                                            
1 Egypt: New President Must Restore Rule of Law, Govern for All, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-
new-president-must-restore-rule-law-govern-all-2012-06-29 (last visited Sep. 15, 2012).
2 The Mekky Brothers are two Egyptian judges, Aḥmed and Maḥmoud Mekky, who led demonstrations in 2005 
and 2006 denouncing the forging of the parliamentary elections. The participants in these demonstrations were 
mainly judges whose activities were in lieu of the judicial reform movement. The two brothers were appointed 
in key positions by president Morsi: Aḥmed Mekky was appointed as a Minister of Justice, while Maḥmoud 
Mekky was selected to be the vice-president.  As advocates of judiciary independence, appointing the Mekky 
brothers in such important positions was a positive mark.   
3David Hearst, Morsi Offers Hope in Egypt, http://www.canberratimes.com.au/opinion/morsi-offers-hope-in-
egypt-20120814-246zk.html (last visited Oct, 2012).
4 See Egypt defence chief Tantawi ousted in surprise shakeup, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/12/egyptian-defence-chief-ousted-shakeup (last visited Jan, 2013).
5 A/RES/61/39.
6 See TĀRIQ AL-BISHRI, AL-ḤWĀR AL-ISLĀMI AL-ʿALMĀNI [Islamic-Secular Speech] at 45 (Dār al-Shoroūk 2006) 
(1996).
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Theoretically, Sharīʿa is meant to be an applicable methodology that governs the legal system of 
the state. Belief in the divinity of Sharīʿa is a decisive factor which necessitates its application by the 
believers. It is, additionally, a privilege of Sharīʿa that it defies autocracy and dictatorship.  Sharīʿa 
in this respect is in conformity with democracy as a governance system which has been long called 
for by civilized nations. Sharīʿa is, further, effective in handling the “shortcomings of democracy”
which are referred to in Carl Schmitt’s book Legality and Legitimacy.7 Sharīʿa effectively fits as a 
higher source of legitimacy in a way that, on the one hand, would resolve the conflict between 
legality and legitimacy highlighted by Schmitt, and would overcome the impracticality or 
irrationality of any other proposed norm to be a superior source of legitimacy such as human rights 
or natural law on the other hand.
Out of their belief that the law to be applied would control the society in accordance with the 
ideology of the lawmaker, Islamists in Egypt insist on applying Sharīʿa to control Egyptian society in 
accordance with a divine ideology. Islamists, through this belief, admit the direct relationship 
between the applied law in a given society and the ideology widely held in this society.  Although 
this belief is accurate in theory, the influence of law on a society’s ideology is conditioned upon the 
role of law in this society. The outcome of the Islamists’ belief would not be guaranteed unless the 
law in the society rules.
However, this is not the situation in Egypt. The law has long been passive while the key ruler in 
Egypt has been the culture of fear.8 Perhaps the country’s police force have played the main role in 
developing such culture in Egyptians daily life, but fundamentalist Islamists9 have also played a 
parallel role in developing a similar culture in the area of intellectual expression. While the police 
have succeeded in altering the culture of dignity on the basis of a citizen’s contribution to society’s
                                                            
7 CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer trans. & ed., Duke University Press 2004) (1932).
8 The culture of fear was a predominant ruling mechanism during Mubarak days and I believe it is still 
prominent after the revolution of 2011. Ruling through fear was to constantly intimidate and humiliate citizens 
so that their ultimate aspirations become merely to live with dignity. Intimidating people could have been either 
by unjust application of law, application of unjust laws sentences intentionally by the National Assembly, or by 
other coercive means such as kidnapping, torturing, or even imposing royalties.    
9 Religious Fundamentalism is a trend of thought that deprives humans, whether singular or plural, of their right 
to submit their social, political, or economic issues to reasoning; the only task allowed for is to deduce aḥkām or 
jurisprudential rules from recognized texts and to compel the others to follow these rules under the cover of 
discouraging almunkar or evil. See SHERIF YOUNIS, SAYYED QUTB WA AL-ŪSULIYYA AL-ISLAMIYYA [Sayyed 
Qutb and Islamic Fundamentalism] at 5 (Dar Tiba 1995).
2
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welfare, liberal Islamists10 have been intimidated by their fellow fundamentalists with respect to 
freedom of religious discretion. 
Accordingly, this thesis argues that no legal system, whether Islamic or secular, would succeed in 
control society’s behaviours in accordance with the ideology of the lawmaker so long as the society 
is not ruled by law. The developed culture of fear in Egypt needs to be altered by the rule of law 
and by enhancing freedom of expression in order to advance an updated model of Sharīʿa, and for 
this model to be accurately applied.
In pursuit of fleshing out the above argument, this thesis is divided into two major parts, the first 
of which explores the theory of establishing a state on the basis of Sharīʿa, specifically with reference 
to the what I call “fundamentalist” perspective. The second part gives special concern to the 
situation in Egypt today, specifically regarding the rule of law and the situation of freedom of 
conscience.
I start by tracing the origins of the fundamentalist idea of a Sharīʿa-based state by discussing 
Sayyed Qutb’s scholarship in this regard. I then argue in agreement with Carl Schmitt on Legality 
and Legitimacy that Sharīʿa is indeed in harmony with democracy, specifically in handling the 
latter’s shortcomings. From there, I thirdly move on to analyse “natural law” as an attempt to 
allocate a superior source of legitimacy, other than Sharīʿa, that may handle the defects of legitimacy
in a democratic system and the possible reasons beyond neglecting religious legal norms in action.
The second part of the thesis handles the situation in Egypt regarding the absence of the rule of 
law, before and after the Revolution of 2011, and the dilemma of freedom of conscience and the its
effect on any prospective legal order. It is my firm belief that without the second part of this thesis, 
all that is said in the first part will remain only theory, and not practice.  It is therefore important to 
understand my thesis in its totality, and thus should be read with both parts in mind.   
                                                            
10Islamic Liberalism advocates are also called mujadedūn or modernists. Liberalism calls for the use of reason in 
applying religious text and to reconcile religion with the modern world. See id. Examples of prominent Islamic 
modernists are Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ʿabduh.
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II. The Fundamentalist Theory of Applying Sharīʿa:
Islamic scripts, such as the Qurʾān and Sūnna, contain a number of provisions directed at 
regulating the relationships among key members of society such as between the ruler and the citizen.  
Scripts also provide for a system for both external and domestic affairs.  There are two successive 
verses in Sūrat Al-Nisāʾ (Qurʾān 4: 58-59) that are said to have such content which are:
God commands you [people] to return things entrusted to you to their 
rightful owners, and, if you judge between people, to do so with justice: 
God’s instructions to you are excellent, for He hears and sees everything. 
You who believe, obey God and the Messenger, and those in authority 
among you. If you are in dispute over any matter, refer it to God and the 
Messenger, if you truly believe in God and the Last Day: that is better and 
fairer in the end.11
A common interpretation, supported by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawy, provides that the first of 
these two verses is directed at the ruler, while the second is at the citizen.12 Codifying the legal order 
contained in Islamic scripts has long been subject to great scholarly efforts. Examples of such 
efforts are Al-Siyāsa Al-Sharʿiyya for Ibn Taimiah and for Abdul-Wahhāb Khallāf. 13   Islamic 
tradition also witnessed the immigration (Hijra) of Muslims to al-Madīna and the establishment of 
an Islamic society for which the Prophet established rules through watheqat al-Madīna, or the 
Charter of Madīna, which contained the basic rules regulating various relationships in society.14
Esposito argues and I agree with him that the Hijra, as an event in and of itself, had even political 
implications, one of which was the importance of community in Islamic civic life. Such a 
proposition, as per Esposito, suggests the importance of society in Islam from adopting the year of 
Hijra to date Islamic history instead of any other Islamic event such as the date of Muhammad's birth 
or his reception of the first revelation in 610 C.E.15 However, for the purpose of this thesis is to 
analyze the fundamentalist project in Egypt, it would be most effective to confine our analyses of the 
                                                            
11Qurʾān 4: 58-59. The original Arabic reads as follows:
"ِب اومُكحت ْنَأ ِسانلا نيب متمَكح اَذِإو اهلهَأ ىَلِإ تانامَأْلا اودؤت ْنَأ مُكرمْأي هَّللا َّنِإ اعيمس َناَك هَّللا َّنِإ هِب مُكُظعي امعِن هَّللا َّنِإ ِلدعْلا
ايرصب . اييش يف متعزانت ْنِإَف مُكنم ِرمَأْلا يلوُأو َلوسرلا اوعيطَأو هَّللا اوعيطَأ اونمَآ نيذَّلا اهيَأ متنُك ْنِإ ِلوسرلاو هَّللا ىَلِإ هودرَف ٍء
ِوْأت نسحَأو ريخ كلَذ ِرخَآْلا ِمويْلاو هَّللاِب َنونمؤتاًلي".  
12YUSUF AL-Qaradāwy, Fiqh Al-Dawla fi Al-Islam [State in an Islamic Discourse] at 15 (Dār Al-Shorūk 2009)
13IBN TAIMIAH, AL-SIYĀSA AL-SHARʿIYYA FI ISLAḤ AL-RAʿĪ WA AL-RAʿIYYA (Dar al-Helāl 1981); ADUL-WAHHAB KHALLAF,
AL-SIYĀSA AL-SHARʿIYYA at 19 (Dār Al-Qalam 1988).
14SĀLEM AL-BAHNASĀWI, FIKR SAYYED QUTB FI MIZĀN AL-SHARʿ [Religious Scaling of Sayyed Qutb’s Thought] at 90 
(Dār Al-Wafāʿ 2000).
15JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM. THE STRAIGHT PATH at 8(New York/ Oxford 1998).
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idea of applying Sharīʿa to the fundamentalist perspective. Having limited the scope of analysis, 
there would be no better way than to analyze the idea through studying the thesis of one of the most 
distinguished ideologues of fundamentalism, Sayyed Qutb.16
A. Sayyed Qutb’s Thesis:
Sayyed Qutb was born in October 1906 in a village called Mūsha close to Assiut Governorate, 
Egypt.17 Being an Islamic intellectual was not in itself a denunciation; but being a radical Islamist, 
in the viewpoint of Egyptian secret police, was. Categorizing Qutb as a radical ideologue subjected 
him to brutality and imprisonment and, eventually, execution. However, Qutb left a legacy of 
thought, which has influenced many of his successors. Qutb’s main thesis was “a lucid, if not 
systematic, critique of modernity” as a sort of institutionalism predicated on “the accumulation of 
wealth and power.”18
In a number of his publications,19 Qutb repeated his belief that every community must be 
founded on a religious basis. This necessity stems from the nature of Sharīʿa itself, which is 
described by Qutb as Manhaj Ḥaiāa,20 or a Methodology of Human Life. In that sense, Qutb 
reinforced the proposition that Sharīʿa is not confined to belief or historical scripts whose application 
is limited to a certain period of time. Pursuant to this perception, Qutb referred to the role of the 
Torah, the Bible, and Qurʾan in maintaining effective social order, which is derived from absolute 
knowledge of human nature.
According to Sayyed Qutb, the Islamic religion is a methodology of human life. It includes 
perceptions of belief, which interpret the nature of existence, and determines the position of a human
in this existence, as it determines the purpose from his existence. This methodology includes 
systems that emerge from that perception and constitute the life of human beings. They include 
moral principles and the authority from which they are derived, and the socio-political, international
and economic systems. 
                                                            
16 Supra note 9, at 9. 
17 Id. at 23. 
18Laith Saud, The Islamic roots of the Egyptian Revolution, J. Islamic L. & Culture 12:3, 187-196) (2010).
19 See This Religion (Hādha Al-Dēn), Signs Along the Path (MAʿALEM FI AL-TARĒQ), and The Future is for this 
Religion (AL-MUSTAQBAL L’Hādha Al-Dēn).
20 SAYYED QUTB, Hādha Al-Dēn at 5 (Dar al-Shorouk 1982). The original Arabic reads as follows: 
ةایح جھنم.
5  
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In his book The Future is for this Religion, Sayyed Qutb expressed his severe concern about the 
success of any human experience away from Sharīʿa. In his words, “humanity may experience 
variable tribulations here and there… but we are confident about the end of these experiences.” 21
Qutb is confident that at the end the future will be for this religion, Islam. The confident voice of 
Qutb was an outcome of not just his strong belief, but also of his doubt about human capabilities. 
According to him, people may decide for themselves, but they would never succeed as long as their 
decisions are not guided by God’s rulings. The reason given is that the human experience is running 
through a vicious circle. This circle is of the human perception and experience which is blemished 
by ignorance, deficiency, weakness, and whim; while salvation necessitates escaping this circle and 
starting a new experience. The new alternative proposed by Qutb was to resort to the divine 
methodology which is “derived from knowledge rather than ignorance, perfection rather than 
deficiency, power rather than weakness, and wisdom rather than whim.”22
The reason given by Qutb that gives the privilege for this religion in the future is that Islam,
according to the foregoing perspective, includes all the coherent factors of life that arrange all of its 
pillars and fulfill all the real needs of the human. According to this perspective:
this religion is not just a belief which is isolated from the reality of human 
life… or some rituals that are conducted by some people… in order for 
them to join this religion, and it is not just a path to the heaven of the 
hereafter while there is another path … to the heaven of the here other than 
rules of religion.23
Qutb extended his contention to other divine religions. He emphasized that these religions are 
not historical scripts whose application is limited within a certain period of time or local regimes for 
a group of people; rather, they are the stable methodologies God assigned for humans.
In this regard, Qutb used the term ʿibada, or worshipping, in describing the act of humans 
towards any person when they incorporate that person’s methodology in their daily matters. In 
Qutb’s words, “every methodology of life is a religion.”24 In that sense, the religion of a certain 
                                                            
21 The original Arabic reads as follows:
"كانھ و انھ ةعونتم براجت فاستعا يف يضمت دق ةیرشبلا نإ ...لأا نم نوقثاو ،براجتلا هذھ ةیاھن ىلإ نونئمطم اننكل وفاطملا ةیاھن يف رم."  
22 The original Arabic reads as follows:
" ملع نع رداصلا ينابرلا جھنملا ةدعاق)لھجلا لدب ( لامك و)صقنلا لدب ( ةردق و)فعضلا لدب ( ةمكح و)ىوھلا لدب "...(
23 The original Arabic reads as follows:
"نیدلا اذھ و- رابتعلاا اذھب-  درجم سیل ةیرشبلا ةایحلا عقاو نع ةلزعنم ةینادجو ةدیقع ...نیدلا اذھب نونمؤملا اھیدؤی ةیدبعت رئاعش درجم سیل و ...
نیدلا ةفص مھل نوكتف ! رخآ قیرط كانھ امنیب ؛يورخلأا سودرفلا قیقحتل ةرخلآا ىلإ قیرط درجم سیل و... ریغ ،يضرلأا سودرفلا قیقحتل
نیدلا اذھ جھنم"...  
6
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group of people is the methodology according to which their matters are executed. Consequently, if 
this methodology is divine, those people would be under the religion of God. But if this 
methodology is made by a king, prince, tribe, nation, or any human philosophy, these people would 
be under the religion of whomever they follow.25
Qutb supported his proclamation by referring to the approach of his contemporaries who frankly 
describe their social philosophies and theories as beliefs tantamount to religion. The example given 
was the theory of Communism which is not just a social order; it is a perception of belief which is 
based on the perception of the materialism of this universe. Communism as a theory adopts the 
economic interpretation of history, originating the evolutions of human life in the evolution of the 
means of production, and the belief in dialectical materialism. Therefore, Qutb concluded that 
Communism is not just a social order, but also a perception of belief upon which it is claimed that a 
social order is based.26
In that sense, the key difference between the methodology of religion and other methodologies is 
that the believers in the former worship one God from whom they acquire perceptions, values, 
morality, regimes, and legislations; while humans under any other methodology acquire these values 
from other humans. This acquirement gives some humans authority over others which is tantamount 
to divinity, while in fact these humans remain as human as their followers.
The systems where humans follow, or in Qutb’s words worship, other humans, are called in 
Islam the regimes of the time of pagan ignorance, (jahiliyya), no matter how plentiful its forms are 
because these systems are founded on the bases for which religions came to destroy. Religions came 
to free humans from all forms of worshipping each other and to unify the God to be worshiped.27
The Arabic term Islam means, literally, to submit or to surrender.28 Based on this definition, 
Qutb composed a broader picture of Islam as a submission to God and a full adoption of His 
methodology. In that sense, following the methodology of Islam and submitting, or surrendering, to 
God is what is meant by the word Islam. Therefore, the word Muslim does not only apply to those 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
24 SAYYED QUTB, AL-MUSTAQBAL L’HĀDHA AL-DĒN at 13 (Dār al-Shorouk 1982). The original Arabic reads as 
follows:
"نید وھ ةایحلل جھنم لك".
25 SAYYED Qutb, MAʿĀLEM FI AL-TARĒQ [Signs along the Path] at 52 (Dar al-Shorouk 1987).
26 See supra note 24, at 14.
27 Id. at 53.
28 ABI AL-AʿLA AL-MAWDŪDI, Mabadeʾ Al-Islam [The Principles of Islam] 4 (Dar Al-Arabia 7th ed.).
7
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who believe in Muhammad as a prophet in addition to believing in the only God, it also applies to all 
of those who completely submit or surrender to Allah:
If God is the lord, then the Muslim is His servant before whom submission 
(islam) or obedience is the most natural and appropriate response. The 
term "Muslim" means "one who submits" or surrenders to God; it includes 
everyone who follows His guidance and performs His will. All the great 
monotheistic prophets are regarded as true Muslims.29
Henceforth, Qutb reached his conclusion, with which I fully agree, that if humans lived under the 
foregoing methodology as a whole, they would be Muslims. But if they lived under any other 
methodology, they would live under pagan ignorance. 
B. Shariʿa Application and Choice for Believers:
The reason why I agree with Qutb’s thesis is that applying Sharīʿa is not a matter of choice to 
believers. The obligation of applying Sharīʿa is unequivocally stated in the Qurʾān:
We sent to you [Muhammad] the Scripture with truth, confirming the 
Scriptures that came before it, and with final authority over them: so judge 
between them according to what God has sent down. Do not follow their 
whims, which deviate from the truth that has come to you. We have 
assigned a law and a path to each of you. If God has willed, He would 
have made you one community, but He wanted to test you through that 
which He has given you, so race to do good: you will all return to God and 
He will make clear to you the matters you differed about. So [prophet] 
judge between them according to what God has sent down. Do not follow 
their whims, and take good care that they do not tempt you away from any 
of what God has sent down to you. If they turn away, remember that God 
intends to punish them for some of the sins they have committed: a great 
many people are lawbreakers. Do they want judgment as in the time of 
pagan ignorance? Is there any better judge than God for those of firm 
faith?30
The cited verses refer to the sealing Scripture, Qurʾān, revealed to the Prophet Muhammad that 
complements other preceding Scriptures, Torah and Gospel, and have final authority over them. The 
                                                            
29 Supra note 15, at 23. 
30 Qurʾān 5:48-50. The original Arabic reads as follows:
" نيب امِّل اًقدصم قحْلاِب باتكْلا كيَلِإ انْلزنَأو امع مهءاوهَأ عِبتت َلاو هَّللا َلزنَأ امِب مهنيب مُكحاَف هيَلع انميهمو ِباتكْلا نم هيدي نم كَءاج
ِّل نكَلو ًةدحاو ًةمُأ مُكَلعجَل هَّللا ءاش وَلو اجاهنمو ًةعرش مُكنم انْلعج ٍّلُكل قحْلا هَّللا ىَلِإ تاريخْلا اوُقِبتساَف مُكاتآ ام يف مُكوُلبي
َنوُفلتخت هيف متنُك امِب مُكُئبنيَف اعيمج مُكعِجرم .ِضعب نع كونتْفي نَأ مهرَذحاو مهءاوهَأ عِبتت َلاو هَّللا َلزنَأ امِب مهنيب مُكحا نَأو  ام
ثَك َّنِإو مِهِبونُذ ِضعبِب مهبيصي نَأ هَّللا ديِري امنَأ مَلعاَف اوَّلوت نِإَف كيَلِإ هَّللا َلزنَأَنوُقساَفَل ِسانلا نم اير . نمو َنوغبي ةيلهاجْلا مْكحَفَأ
نقوي ٍموَقِّل امْكح هَّللا نم نسحَأَنو".
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verses also refer to an obligation imposed upon those who believe in God to apply what is sent down 
By Him. Applying the rules revealed by God is not a matter of choice for those who believe in Him. 
Belief necessitates the unconditional compliance with the Creator’s orders. If this omnipotent 
Creator prescribed some rules, all those who believe in that Creator would also believe in his 
warnings against non-compliance. There is also no need to examine whether or not these rules are 
just or not because “it follows from that its rules, directly as they flow from. . . God. . . are as 
immediately evident as the rules of logic and thus require no force for their realization.”31
So, it is the matter of belief in the Creator which controls the unconditional obedience to His 
orders which entails applying what sent down by him to the Prophet Muhammad. But it needless to 
say that implementing God’s revelation, that is to say Sharīʿa, necessitates a preliminary substantive
determination of the fundamental structure of Sharīʿa itself.
To begin with, the Arabic word ‘Sharīʿa’ “originally meant the path or track by which camels 
were taken to water, and so by transfer the path ordained of God by which men may achieve 
salvation.”32 In legal terms, using the word Sharīʿa in that sense refers to a certain methodology or 
path. Pointing at a certain path and determining that it is the one prescribed to walk through has 
triggered great scholarly effort to analyse all the relevant sources of revelation. Generally:
It is agreed among the Muslim scholars of all their various schools that 
everything issuing from a human being, whether speech or act, whether an 
act of worship [ʿibādāt] or mutual interaction [between men] [muʿamalāt], 
whether crime, personal status, or any type of contract or legal act, has in 
the Divine Law of Islam [al-sharīʿa al-islāmiyya] a legal rule [or status, 
evaluation, determination, ḥukm, pl. aḥkām]. Some of these rules are made 
clear by texts which appear in the Qurʾān and sunna, and some of them are 
not... but: the sharīʿa establishes proofs of them and provides indications 
for them such that the qualified legal scholar [mujtahid] is able by means 
of these proofs and indications to arrive at them and discover them.33
The aggregate of these aḥkām is supposed to be the constituent element of Sharīʿa. In that sense, 
Sharīʿa is supposed to constitute of a set of clear, systematic and unequivocal rules. Nonetheless, 
Islamic law has never been as such. There has never been such thing “as a, that is one, Islamic law, a 
                                                            
31HANS KELSEN, NATURAL LAW DOCTRINE AND LEGAL POSITIVISM at 244 (Wölfgang Herbert Kraus trans., 
1956).
32KNUT S. VIKOR, BETWEEN GOD AND THE SULTAN (Oxford University Press 1999).  
33ʿABD AL-WAHHĀB KHALLĀF, ʿILM UṢŪL AL-FIQH (Science of the Roots of Islamic Jurisprudence) at 7 (a modern 
work first published 1942).
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text that clearly and unequivocally establishes all the rules of a Muslim’s behaviour”34 mainly due to 
the “great divergence of views, not just between opposing currents, but also between individual 
scholars within the legal currants, of exactly what rules belong to the Islamic law.” 35 Such 
divergence is what establishes for Islamic pluralism known as ikhtilāf.36 Statistics show that there is 
almost no unified vision across the Muslim world regarding what Sharīʿa is and what its main 
components are even with the ever-increasing number of Sharīʿa supporters.37
Not only are the rules of Sharīʿa subject to disagreement, perceiving how to apply these rules is 
also not uniform. Considering each and every situation and individual as unique in Islamic tradition 
necessitated context-specific ijtihad, thereby Islamic law did not apply equally to all.38 Hence, “the 
law was an ijtihadic process; a continuously renewed ... effort at mustering principles as located in 
life -situations; a mission requiring the legists to do what is right in a particular moment of human 
existence.”39
Yet, that God is the lawgiver and that the law should be exclusively deduced from His revelation 
are indisputable paradigms held even among the advocates of different views of what Sharīʿa is.40  
So far, Islamic law is comprised of a set of “sources of revelation and a methodology for making 
rules from these sources.”41 The divergent outcomes of the rules-making process is what resulted in 
Islamic law being still indefinite. 
Further, there are some scholars who suspect that the outcome of the mere process of deducing 
aḥkām constitute Sharīʿa; to them, Sharīʿa is “the divine will as only God knows it; an abstract divine 
law only perceived by Him.” Incorporating this perception renders all the efforts of jurists human
fiqh or law rather than a divine methodology.42 But the fiqh as described by Waʾel B. Hallāq:
never was "the law" in its full range, in its realisation within a social 
environment, nor did it ever constitute a totalising statement of the law in 
practice. The fiqh, in other words was a discursive practice on its own, 
playing by its own rules, neither engaged in transforming reality, nor 
                                                            
34Id. 
35Id.
36 Id.
37Waʿel B. Hallāq, What is Sharīʿa, 151 Islamic & Middle E. L. 154 (2005-2006).  
38Id. at 168. 
39Id.
40Supra note 33. 
41Id. 
42Supra note 31.
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managing or controlling society as modern law does as a matter of 
necessity.43
Most commonly, the term Sharīʿa is used to refer to all the rules resulted from using the science 
fiqh in deducing the legal rules from their sources by mujtahids even with the variant and inconsistent 
nature of these rules.44 Such perception of Sharīʿa can be seen to be adopted in some Muslim 
countries’ legislation such as Egypt where “[t]he preparatory work of the Civil Code shows that 
[Sharīʿa] means the combination of principles common to the different schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence.45  In that sense, Sharīʿa is not a product of a representative democracy reflected in the 
parliament; but rather, it is “the result of individual efforts by scholars working with God’s 
revelation.”46   The pivotal role of jurists in forming this body of law is what gives Sharīʿa its 
individualistic characteristic giving rise to the so called ‘jurists’ law.47
Human interference in deducing divine laws is necessitated due to the absence of unequivocal 
divine law-code, and is approached in a fashion similar to that of the judge in common law systems 
“where society or its custom is the actual ‘legislator’, and the judge must discover what this lawgiver 
has said, through his particular methodology, precedents.”48
Another distinguishing characteristic of Sharīʿa is that, unlike the law of the modern nation-state 
which is made by virtue of state power and “superimposed from the centre in a downward 
direction,”49 Sharīʿa is “originated from, and cultivated itself within, the very social order which it 
came to serve in the first place.”50 Such unique characteristic entails another unique concept of self-
governance by the society, apart from the state, which is an alien concept to today’s governance 
systems.51  
However, advocating Sharīʿa is by no means an advocacy of self-governance; the pattern of 
Sharīʿa advocated today is a modernized model of what is regarded as historical Sharīʿa, 52 in 
                                                            
43Supra note 37, at 167.
44Supra note 31.  
45LIBERAL ISLAM, A SOURCEBOOK at 50 (Charles Kurzman ed., NEW YORK/ OXFORD 1998).
46Supra note 31.
47Supra note 37.
48Supra note 31.
49Supra note 37, at 159.
50Id. at 156. 
51Id.
52Id.
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accordance with fiqh, to the extent necessary to “accommodate the exigencies of the modern 
world.”53
III. Sharīʿa and Democracy:
In addition to the obligatory nature of Sharīʿa implementation, the second reason why I agree 
with Qutb’s thesis is that it overcomes some of the drawbacks of democracy. 
Recently, the concept of democracy has become a subject of debate in Egypt. After it had been 
called for by activists, fundamentalists denounced democracy as kufr or infidelity. For those 
fundamentalists, democracy contradicts Sharīʿa as it calls for the people to rule themselves by 
themselves; while Islamic scripts assign rule exclusively to God. However, infidelity is not amongst 
the drawbacks which I think Sharīʿa addresses. I further think that the infidelity accusation is a 
totally disjointed argument. Democracy is a purely political issue; and with political I mean those 
strategic matters of governance such as the relation between the ruler and the rest of the authorities, 
between the government and the people, and between the state and other countries. The strategies 
adopted in arranging the relation between all of these actors, and the procedures followed within and 
amongst them, are political in nature which can be freely adopted or abandoned without being 
accused of infidelity.
Islamic tradition has witnessed acts of importing foreign procedural systems, even from non-
Muslim countries, without triggering the “infidelity” speech. During the period of military 
expeditions and conquests, there were novel problems that were faced by Caliphs. Facing such 
problems necessitated discretion in order to either innovate a new relevant system or to update
existing ones. For instance, ʿUmar Ibn Al-Khattab decided to retain the conquered territories in the 
form of public ownership instead of dividing them up among the soldiery.54 Likewise, he developed 
a new concept of land tenure through advancing a new land-tax (kharāj) from the occupier.55
Further, ʿUmar established the pay-roll register, or diwān, in 641 to facilitate the distribution of 
stipends which is a system imported from Persia, a non-Muslim country at that time.56 The said 
instances clearly elaborate the freedom of discretion early disciples, known to be loyal to Sharīʿa,
enjoyed in importing procedural systems.
                                                            
53Id.
54 NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW at 23 (Edinburgh 1964).
55 Id.
56 Id. 
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The same is held true for democracy as a governance system. What makes democracy a purely 
political issue are the core values it aims at. Although technically democracy means self-
governance, its essence is for the people to freely choose their ruler and to have the right to dismiss 
or change him in case he deviated from core values.57 In addition, people under such a system retain 
the right to choose the governance system.
In that sense, democracy does not contradict the Islamic mandate regarding God’s position. 
Assigning governance to the people, which is the essence of democracy, is the an opposite of
autocracy, which is the essence of dictatorship, rather than God’s ruling which was earlier called Al-
Hakmiyya by Khāwarij which means assigning every matter related to ruling to God.58 Therefore, 
democracy is in conformity with the Islamic system which combats dictatorship, adopts the principle 
of governance through consultation, and urges nations not to submit to tyranny.
The accusation of infidelity within the political sphere is not of recent nature; it has its roots in 
the early struggle between two of Muhammad’s disciples, ʿAli ibn abi-Taleb and Muʿawiya ibn abi-
Sūfyān, on the occasion of appointing a new caliph in the year of 37 AH.  Before that date, struggles 
that emerged in the social life of Muslims were political in nature. But the split of Khāwarij during 
this particular struggle was the turning point in the nature of the struggle among Muslim Arabs. 
Khāwarij did not just consider struggles as political affairs, but they claimed that they were the 
faithful and anyone but them the infidel.59 The crisis increased when the opponents used the same 
weapon whereas almost the rest of the Islamic currants involved religion in their political 
principles.60 The resulting extremism and deviance have continued to exist until the present day. 
They can be seen in today’s accusations of infidelity directed towards those who discuss purely 
political issues. Among these purely political issues is the call for democracy as a way of 
governance. 
Misconceiving democracy as a substitute for God’s ruling has forced some fundamentalists to 
reject democracy since the people may consent to any extreme norm. To those fundamentalists, 
consensus alone renders such norms valid regardless of any superior principle. The proponents of 
                                                            
57 Supra note 12, at 132.
58 Id.
59 MUHAMMAD ʿOMARA, TAYARĀT AL-FIKR A-ISLAMI [Trends of Islamic Thought] at 13 (Dār al-Shorūk 2007) 
(1991).
60 Id.
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this perspective support their contentions by using examples such as the legalization of the marriage 
of homosexuals in some countries.61
This argument seems rational on its face. This is especially true because of the extreme nature of 
the examples given. It might be shocking to know that a woman got married to a vintage warehouse 
even if that was to defend it against prospective demolition.62 It is even more striking for some to 
hear about that woman who got married to a donkey because she was just in love with it.63
Recently in two American States, Washington and Colorado, dealing in marijuana was legalized 
as an effect of a referendum.  It was formally acknowledged by the Washington state governor Chris 
Gregoire who stated that “the voters have decided to decriminalize marijuana possession and tax its 
sale and we will follow the will of the people.”64
However, I believe that the above contentions underestimate the standards every society imposes 
on itself according to which their matters are regulated. These standards are often driven from the 
long agreed traditions and culture within any given society. The main difference between a Muslim 
society and a non-Muslim one is that in the former Sharīʿa, as a reference, supersedes any agreed 
tradition.
In Islam, the supremacy of positive law is subordinate to that of Sharīʿa. In a typical democratic 
system, the legislative power is unlimited so long as it is an expression of people’s will through their
representatives. But the situation in Islam is quiet different as Sharīʿa is superior and unalterable by 
any entity, including national assemblies. In that sense, Islam was the first system to limit the 
powers of the ruling majority and combat tyranny in conformity with the core goals later adopted by
democracy advocates.
On the other hand, although democracy was mainly concerned with combating autocratic 
tyranny, it did not succeed in combating other forms of tyranny such as transitory ruling majority.
The failure of democracy in this respect, inter alia, was best illustrated by Carl Schmitt in Legality 
                                                            
61 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/specialreports/countries-where-same-sex-marriage-is-
legal/2012/05/10/gIQAwOziFU_gallery.html#photo=4 (last visited Nov. 22, 2012).
62 http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/01/woman-wants-to-marry-seattle-building/(last visited Oct. 8, 
2012).
63 http://beyondjane.com/family/marriage/american-woman-falls-in-love-with-a-donkey-and-marry-him/(last 
visited Oct. 30, 2012).
64 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-battle-looms-over-marijuana-
initiatives/2012/11/07/cce5033e-28f5-11e2-bab2-eda299503684_story.html (last visited Sep. 9, 2012).
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and Legitimacy65 in which he described the collapse of the domestic political condition in Weimar 
Republic Germany in terms of public and constitutional law. The following is a review of Schmitt’s 
main critiques of democracy followed by my argument regarding how Sharīʿa handles these 
shortcomings.
A. Review of Carl Schmidt’s Critiques of Democracy: 
Schmitt introduced the book by defining the legislative state system of legality compared to 
other state types: jurisdiction, governmental, and administrative.66 According to the author, the 
legislative state is a political system where norms receive high regard and are a decisive expression 
of the “community will,” a state type governed by impersonal, general, pre-established norms that 
have a definable, determinable content, and a state where lawmaker, the legislative, and officials 
responsible for legal application, the executive, are separated from one another. Consequently, all 
government acts and powers, other substantive areas, affairs, and public functions are on the basis 
of law and subordinate to norms.67  
The parliament in this state type is a legislative organ which only establishes valid norms and 
has a superior position based on the dignity of the lawmaker. It follows from this state type a 
concept of legality which means that only valid, impersonal norms are being applied. This system 
of legality justifies obedience, the suspension of the right of resistance, and state coercion.68
There are other political forms of states where the decisive political will emerges in other forms 
of procedures one of which is the jurisdiction state where the deciding judge has the last word.
There is also the type of the governmental state whose characterized expression is found on the 
exalted personal will and authoritative command of the ruling head of the state. Schmitt describes 
the administrative state type as a system which applies objective directive rather than higher norms 
or personal commands or will. Neither men nor valid norms rule; rather, things administer 
themselves. Its expression is in the administrative decree which is determined in accordance with 
circumstances, in reference to the concrete situation, and motivated only by considerations of 
factual-practical purposefulness. Executable and easily obeyed command which has a legal value 
in itself is a characteristic of both governmental and administrative states. 
                                                            
65 Supra note 7.  
66 Id. at 3 
67 Id.
68 Id. at 10. 
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Schmitt referred to the historical fact that linkages and mixtures among all these types appear 
since in every state there is an element of legislation as well as of administration and even of
judicial decision.69 According to Schmitt, all of these elements are reunited in the sovereign who is 
the final source of legality, and the ultimate foundation of legitimacy.70
But then, Schmitt highlighted the possible inconsistencies between peoples’ will, in the form of 
legitimacy, and the law, in the form of legality. Such effect is claimed by Schmitt to be an outcome 
of the disparity of the sources of legality and legitimacy. Schmitt identified this situation in the 
Weimar Republic by emphasizing that by the time his book was written, the closed system of 
legality, in the instance of will that is in conformity with law, emerged in opposition to legitimacy.
The example he gave was the dissolution of the Reichsatg as being legal even if it was a coup 
d’état on the one hand, while on the other considering the dissolution of a parliament as illegal 
even if in conformity with the constitution.71 That shows that the situation in the parliamentary 
legislative state is that the rationalism of the system of legality is “recast into its opposite.”72
As a protective guarantee against possible coercion in a democracy, Schmitt introduced the 
principle of trust in the legislator.73 According to this perspective, the law comes about with the 
participation of the representative assembly. The lawmaker is the “final guardian of the law,”74 the 
only legislator, and “the conclusive source of all legality.”75 This presumed harmony between 
justice and legality dominated the legal thinking of the legislative state. Through this, it is possible 
to subordinate one self to the rule of law in the name of freedom, remove the right to resistance, 
and prioritize the state. The confidence in the legislator is a strong guarantee of moderation and 
secure protection of freedom and property contained in the legislative process against misuse of the 
legal form and, therefore, there is no need for further restrictions on his powers. This confidence is 
the prerequisite for every constitution that organizes the legislative state; otherwise, it would be 
absolutism. 76 This system of legality has presuppositions that statutes must have substantive 
relation to law and justice and, therefore, every state act can be made legal through a decision of 
parliament. 
                                                            
69 Id. at 5.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 10.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 19.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 20. 
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However, Schmitt expressed his concern about this principle as it leads to considering whatever 
is created by the lawmaker, represented in the parliament’s simple majority, as “law” and “right.”77
In this respect, Schmitt shared Islamic fundamentalists’ key caveat about democracy. The shared 
caveat is the neutral, value and quality free concept of legality without content.78
Another guarantee suggested by Schmitt was constitutional guarantees. 79 This form of 
guarantee was suggested on the occasion of criticizing the rationale behind the requirement of 
higher majority votes, a qualified two-thirds majority, as a matter of making the process of 
decision-making more difficult in cases involving substantive law norm with definite substantive 
law content. Schmitt criticized the requirement of higher majority since it is considered as the 
current will of transitory two-thirds majority. And this transitory nature is exactly what is 
supposed to be guarded against by substantive constitutional guarantees. 
However, I believe Schmitt did not pay attention to the transitory nature that characterizes the 
will that establishes the constitutional guarantees as well. In that sense, further guarantees would 
be needed to guard against the will, whether of the people or of the legislator, which enacts those 
constitutional guarantees and so on running in a vicious circle.  
Schmitt referred to a third extraordinary lawmaker which democracy failed to guard against 
which is the presidential decree power granted by Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. 80
Although this power is subordinate to the ordinary legislator in the sense of being subject to 
suspension by the parliament in normal situations, it is superior in abnormal or exceptional 
circumstances which are determined by discretion.81
I believe that the same syndrome is found in today’s Egypt. Although the MB claim that they 
are in the process of establishing a democratic governance, Morsi, the Egyptian president, has 
combined in his person both the executive and legislative authorities allegedly because of the 
abnprmal situation Egypt is currently in.  
Schmitt criticizes such a situation as it grants the extraordinary lawmaker the right to determine
the presupposition of his extraordinary powers, state of danger for public security and order, and 
                                                            
77 Id. at 23.
78 Id. at 30.
79 Id. at 45.
80 Id. at 67.
81 Id. at 69. 
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the content of necessary measures.82 Accordingly, he can also reissue measures the elimination of 
which the parliament previously demanded.83 This is a ground for great factual superiority and that 
is considered also in regard to the scope and content.84 While the ordinary legislator is permitted to 
only pass laws, the extraordinary legislator is able to confer on every individual measure he issues 
the character of a statute. Legislative power becomes a weapon in the hands of a dictator.
In addition to general decrees, the executive can issue individual decrees which are supposed to 
be resisted by the system of legal protections. The extraordinary lawmaker combines the 
legislative and the executive characters in his person. 85 In addition to the power to issue 
extraordinary measures, article 48.2.2 grants the exceptional lawmaker the informal authority to 
suspend seven fundamental rights, among which are personal freedom and property.86
Pre-war German state theory considered substantive law as an intrusion into freedom and 
property in addition to the legislative reservation clause which gives the ordinary legislature the 
exclusive right to intrude into those rights.87 This pre-war parliamentary legislative state is 
considered to be totally changed since those basic rights do not apply to the extraordinary 
lawmaker.88
Schmitt contends that in a system of parliamentary legislative state there must be only one 
ordinary lawmaker. Measures and decrees must not have the force of law. But since in Germany
measures became decrees with the force of law and the extraordinary lawmaker possessed powers
over freedom and property, this was considered a then-new heterogeneous way of thought in the 
constitution’s system of legality.89
Schmitt concluded that the current will of the present majority is always an expression resulting
from a compromise of current heterogeneous powers which have little interest in logical 
consistency. That is because of the pluralistic nature of the parliament.90
                                                            
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 70.
85 Id. at 71.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 72.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 73.
90 Id. at 88. 
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Another consequence of this pluralistic system is that the rest of the parties do not have the same 
chance to create a majority in a way that is considered a denial of the principle of equal chance. 
The presupposition of the legality concept of the pluralist parliament collapses in effect. However, 
it was obvious that everything was running according to the traditional system of justification. 
These parties only seek the legality of the momentary possession of power no matter if they are 
running up against the system of a plebiscitary-democratic legitimacy or against the parliamentary 
legislative state’s system of legality. The parliament no longer has the dignity of an assembly that 
issues statutes in a specific manner and is no longer independent. Elections have become a 
plebiscitary procedure rather than selecting presenters and founding independent representation. 
The plebiscitary expression of will, so Schmitt’s argument goes, carries the meaning of a 
decision of one will, such as referenda, since the people would only answer with yes or no without 
being able to discuss. 91 But Schmitt then showed the readiness to accept this plebiscitary 
legitimacy so long as the confidence of not misusing the power of posing questions is observed.92
Schmitt then shows how legality and legitimacy become technical instruments that can be used 
for momentary advantage in a way that would sharpen social strife. 93 Even the possible 
reformation which can be resorted to in order to avoid using the constitution as an instrument can 
be used in itself as an instrument of compromise. 
Schmitt’s proposal for handling the deficiencies of the German democratic system was urging
that the constitution must recognize the substantive characteristics of the German people and their 
right to equal chance;94 otherwise, the constitution would end with destroying its own legality and 
legitimacy. In other words, he only restated the problem without suggesting how to solve it.
In my viewpoint, analysing the above deficiencies necessitates a dramatically different response. 
The proper response to me is to disperse the sources of legality and legitimacy in order to avoid the 
identified inconsistencies. Through this dispersion, the source of legitimacy would constitute the 
frontiers within which legality would operate. 
However, legitimacy would not be superior to legality so long as their sources are on the same 
level, even if they are dispersed. In order for legitimacy to effectively perform this function it 
                                                            
91 Id. at 60.
92 Id. at 90.
93 Id. at 93.
94 Id. 
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requires being driven from a superior source. If the source of legality is positive law, then that of 
legality must not be human. Uninvolving people’s will in considering legitimacy and confining 
their role to positive law making would contribute to the principle of equality between citizens. No 
group would possess powers that exceed that of the others. This is because no group would 
possess the transitory power of legislation represented in the parliament, while others hold the 
residual source of legitimacy, reflected in the people’s will. The power of the two groups in that 
sense would be subordinate to one superior source of legitimacy.
In the remaining pages of this thesis, I propose applying Sharīʿa as a divine source of legitimacy
thereby materialising the desired dispersion of sources, maintaining equalization amongst citizens, 
and combating all sorts of tyranny such as that of the transitory ruling majority or of the ruler in 
abnormal situations.
In a parallel response, democratic systems, usually, seek to deduce general norms, similar to 
Sharīʿa in Islamic systems, in order for them to be superior and not to be exceeded by legislative 
authority. Examples of such superior norms could be natural law or the International Bill of 
Human Rights.95
However, unlike Sharīʿa, the norms of human rights are still alterable as their legitimacy is 
derived from the same source, cultural heritage and human discretion.96
On the other hand, I conceive adhering to natural order as a source of law as an attempt to 
allocate a source of legitimacy which is non-human, thereby elevating it over positive law, while 
still refraining from admitting the existence of divine religions. There are several reasons behind 
this assumption which are discussed below.
B. Natural Law as a Substitute for Sharīʿa:
Natural law as a methodology is perceived as a kind of law that is produced by non-human
agency. This definition was expressed by Hans Kelsen in the context of tracing the source of 
natural and positive laws in order to examine their validity by stating that “[i]t was characteristic 
of the natural-law doctrine… that it used to operate on the assumption of “natural order.”97
                                                            
95 Supra note 12, at 38.
96 Id.
97 HANS KELSEN, NATURAL LAW DOCTRINE AND LEGAL POSITIVISM at 244 (Wölfgang Herbert Kraus trans., 
1956).
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Kelsen further illustrated the main characteristic of natural law contending that “[u]nlike the rules 
of positive law, those prevailing in this “natural order” which govern human conduct are…in 
force...because they stem from God, nature or reason and thus are good, right and just.”98 It 
appears from this illustration that those who believe in the natural-law doctrine equalize the 
sources of this law, such as God, nature or reason, as long as they are not human. 
The first reason why I think that adhering to natural law is no more than an escape from 
embracing Sharīʿa is the fact that the former notion is, I believe, based on impractical nonsense. 
The term natural-law is adhered to by some of those who believe that part of the law can be 
derived from a source which is not human. They equate the sources of this law such as God, 
nature or reason, as long as it is not human but they do not identify a particular one of these 
sources as the only one. The issue is, therefore, still open. It is found as most of the issues of 
traditional jurisprudence, “masked in the protective camouflage of transcendental nonsense.”99 In 
my view, it is nonsense to base a jurisprudential theory on a belief that an order is made by itself.
If we accept that natural law is that law that is revealed by God rather than nature as a way to 
escape the nonsense, I believe that we can not continue calling it natural law, we must call it 
religion instead. In this regard I lean towards sharing Muhammad ʿAbduh’s notion of sunnat Allāh 
which he advanced to describe an ordered system of nature. With the term sunna, ʿAbduh 
described the systematic characteristic of the nature. Conceiving the accuracy of the rules of 
nature as a custom of God influenced ʿAbduh’s interpretation of the Qurʾānic verse: “Had God not 
repelled some of the people by means of others, the earth would have been corrupted”100 so that 
ʿAbduh observed that the verse refers to “a general custom of God and is today commonly referred 
to as the struggle for survival (tanāzuʿ al-baqā).”101
Those who believe in the idea of “the rule of nature” do not clarify how nature is involved in 
the process of lawmaking. They do not describe what the elements of this nature are and what it 
looks like. No clues are given about whether it is a living creature that exists somewhere or a 
fantasy that describes a hypothetical will of the surrounding inanimate nature. Their idea about 
                                                            
98 Id.
99 FELIX COHEN, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, XXXV Colum. L. Rev. 841 809-49 
(1935).
100 The original Arabic reads as follows:
"ساّنلا هَّللا عْفد لاوَلوضرَأْلا تدسَفَل ٍضعبِب مهضعب".
101 MALCOLM H. KERR, ISLAMIC REFORM: THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORIES OF MUḤAMMAD ʿABDUH AND 
RASHĪD RIDĀ at 130 (University of California Press 1966). 
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natural law is not even consistent with Ashʿarite theology which perceives “God’s custom,” rather 
than any regular system of physical laws, as the key resultant in “the workings of nature.”102  
  If it is hypothetical, it would be nonsense to assume something that does not exist. It might be 
argued that assuming the existence of such a lawmaker is an inevitable consequence of 
recognizing the systematic nature of nature’s rules whose accuracy is unalterable. For the rules of 
nature to be that accurate is in and of itself a reason to be a proper source of law. However, such
an answer would mean that those who believe in the idea of the “rule of nature” believe that 
someone, or something, has the characteristics of divinity but they do not actually recognize his 
existence. They may prefer to attribute these characteristics to nature rather than to a God. The 
main point would then be the way one describes and calls this omnipotent creator. Some may call 
him Mother Nature, while some others may call Him God. Therefore, the Ashʿarites, based on 
their belief that the rules of nature are unchanging and dependable, called these rules “God’s 
custom.” 103
Both groups, those who call the creator “Mother Nature” and those who call Him God, believe 
that every thing must first have been created. However, the former group does not believe in a 
certain creator but still believes that there is one. This one, according to them, must have powers 
that exceed that of all humans and the entire world.  Their perception in this sense is consistent 
with the Ashʿarites’ notion of the unchanging and dependable custom of God.  But ultimately,
natural law advocates reach an unreasonable conclusion. They say that the creator is Mother 
Nature as an extraordinary power. 
I argue that those who call the creator Mother Nature refrain from attributing these powers to a 
God because they prefer to stay within the borders of scientific thinking. However, their thinking 
places them outside these borders. They are satisfied with calling the creator Mother Nature as a 
way of ending this discussion no matter how illogical this name is. They may think that through
their denial of the divinity of the creator they would be practical and their ideologies would be 
based on empirical experiences rather than metaphysics. 
The second reason why I think that adhering to natural law is no more than an escape from 
admitting Sharīʿa is that for most Western scholars, admitting religion is a submission to coercion 
                                                            
102 Id. at 119. 
103 Id. 
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and impracticality. There were some historical events104 which I believe resulted in the 
emergence of the common belief that religion is responsible for the world's misfortunes and, 
consequently, the term religion was abandoned and its orders were replaced by the term “rule of 
nature.”
Those events can be summed up in the European Church’s involvement in oppressing scientists
for almost one thousand years.105 The variable accusations for which scientists were oppressed 
and tortured can be grouped under a unified category: falsifying Christian texts. Those falsified 
texts were, however, not among the core Biblical teachings, but rather a combined set of theories 
and information barely known at that time.106 For the primitive and imperfect nature of these 
combined texts, the then-developing sciences easily falsified these scripts. But since these theories 
became sacred through the Popes’ action, falsifying them became an act of infidelity as well. The 
effect of such an accusation could have been of lesser danger if it was not accompanied by the
extreme sanctions adopted by the Church.107 But with the extreme brutality of the Church against 
scientists, Christianity became the enemy and scientists considered religion and science as two 
opposites that can never converge. Then, the influence of European secularism prevailed and 
                                                            
104  The beginning of this era was when the Church attempted to combat the extreme deviance in which 
Romanian emperors indulged. The approach of the Church to stop this destructive deviance was through 
launching a parallel trend of extreme priesthood. The people then uncovered the truth about the personal life of 
some monks which was not only full of pleasure and luxury, but also full of extreme obscenity. Some priests 
lived in luxury similar to that of princes. They were renting the ground of heaven by tickets of forgiveness, 
permitting the violation of the law, granting certificates of survival, and accepting bribes and usuries. A long-
term struggle with kings and emperors then started regarding power and authority. The struggle was violent and 
it ended up with the victory of the Church whereas in 1077 whereas Henry the fourth had to go barefoot to the 
Castle of Canossa and submit to the Pope who allowed him to repent. In addition to its struggle with emperors, 
the Church imposed for itself an authority over the people and forced them to pay huge sums of royalties and 
taxes. The indignant rulers utilized this public pressure to garner public hatred towards the Church and their 
weapon was to uncover for the people the scandals and outrages of those Popes. The situation exacerbated when 
the Church preserved for itself the exclusive right to understand and interpret the Bible. See ABUL-ḤASAN AL-
NEDWI, MADHA KHASER AL-ʿALAM B’ INḤTĀT AL-MUSLMĪN [What the World Lost due to Muslim’s Failure] 
158-168 (Dār Al-Qalam 2007).
105 SALAMA MŪSA, ḤORRIAT AL-FIKR [Freedom of Thought] 38 (Salama Mūsa for Publicity and Distribution 
1935).
106 The Church colored some then-common information about geography, history, and physics with religious 
color and considered them as religious disciplines in which belief was a must. Books and novels were written 
about these scripts which were later called Christian Geography. All these incidents were happening in parallel 
with a rapidly rising trend of science. Those scientists introduced their breakthroughs and experiments by which 
they falsified and criticized the Christians scripts. The Church considered those scientists as infidels and 
founded the Inquisitions to sanction them. See supra note 104.
107 The number of those who were punished by the Inquisitions was almost three hundred thousand, thirty two 
thousand of whom were burnt alive.  Bruno and Galileo were among the victims who were sentenced to death 
for their theories which contradicted the Church’s. See id.  
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affected various communities including the Arab world and it reached in some instances the total 
abandonment of the rules of religion.108
For the foregoing reasons, inter alia, I argue that the outcomes varied between either the total 
abandonment of religion by some secularists or substituting it with the term “natural order” and 
calling the creator Mother Nature. 
IV. The Situation in Egypt:
With specific regard to the Egyptian system, there is almost no contradiction, from an Islamic 
perspective, between legality, in the form of positive law, and legitimacy, in the form of a superior 
legal frame of Sharīʿa. This is because Sharīʿa has been considered in many successive constitutions 
as the main source of legislation.109
Conceptually, situating Sharīʿa at an upper level above people’s ruling does not collide with the 
widespread concept of democracy. The reconciliation between the two systems stems from the unity 
of their purpose, “. . . to embrace the Eternal Oneness of the Absolute.”110 However, whether Sharīʿa
is fully applied or not is currently subject to academic and popular debates.111
The first group contends that Sharīʿa is fully applied except in two respects: the issue of interest
in civil law and the suspension of Hūdūd in the penal code.  The opponents, nonetheless, refute that 
contention and claim that Sharīʿa is not applied since the law allows for some practices which are 
prohibited in Sharīʿa such as consensual fornication, licensed gambling, dealing in intoxications, and
usury.
For the latter group, the path towards applying Sharī‛a seemed closer as the first elected 
president in Egypt, Morsi, has gathered in his hand the legislative authority in addition to the 
                                                            
108 Supra note 105.
109 See SAMI ZUBAIDA, LAW AND POWER IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD at 193 (London/ New York 2003). 
110 Supra note 18, at 190.
111 There are some intellectuals, some of whom are Azharits scholars, who contend that Sharīʿa has been fully 
applied in Egypt since it has been incorporated in the constitution as the main source of legislation. Examples of 
these intellectuals are Sheikh ʿAli Gumʿa http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DwpWOcMaHiw (last visited Dec. 
2012), and Skēna Fuʾād http://www.masrawy.com/news/Egypt/Politics/2012/November/9/5428577.aspx(last 
visited Dec. 2012). There are even MB members who assert that Sharīʿa is fully applied such as president Morsi 
http://www.elbashayer.com/news-223803.html (last visited Dec. 2012). On the other side, there are some others 
refute the former groups’ contention and claim that Sharīʿa is not fully applied such as Yaser Burhāmy and 
Gamāl saber http://www.alwafd.org/  أرابخ-ریراقتو/13-عراشلا%20يسایسلا/298407-رباص -ثیدحلا-ىلع -نأ-ةعیرشلا-ةقَّبطُم-
ملاك -ىضاف (last visited Dec. 2012).    
24
PDF generated by deskPDF Creator Trial - Get it at http://www.docudesk.com
executive after the parliament was dissolved by a Supreme Constitutional Court decision. That is 
mainly because of Morsi’s pertinence to the MB who have always raised the slogan “Islam is the 
Solution” through all their parliamentary contests. However, time passes and there is almost no 
single step taken towards that end. That forced many of the Sharīʿa advocates to revolt demanding 
the full and rapid application of Sharīʿa.112 The situation has worsened as the debates regarding the 
form of application, in case it is applied, has become endless. It has become apparent from these 
debates that there is no unified vision regarding how to apply Sharīʿa amongst Islamists, let alone the 
remainder of the political currents. 
It would appear that all the parties to these ongoing debates have the same impression towards 
the prospective laws and regulations; they are almost seen as being the ultimate means towards a 
new nation-state governed by the rule of law. Such concern is very much present in the current 
discussions regarding the post-revolution constitution. Political powers are accusing each other of 
attempting to dominate the Draft Constitutional Assembly thereby imposing their respective 
ideologies on the society. However, it seems like these debates undermine some factors the 
persistence of which frustrate any attempt to be governed by the rule of law. 
A. Egypt and the Rule of Injustice before 25 January:
The rule of injustice in Egypt was not a chaotic phenomenon; it was rather systematically 
orchestrated through establishing a coalition between the presidency and the police. It is no 
revelation that one of the main causes of the Egyptian uprising was the brutality of the police. The 
coalition of the presidency and the police ruled the country through extreme coercive measures, 
which provided them with the decisive authority domestically. As it was commonly believed, Egypt 
did not have a rule of law, but rather ruling through law.
1. The Executive Branch and Marginalizing the Rule of 
Law:    
Ruling through law included creating an entity completely outside the scope of law, the police, 
which had privileges and powers way beyond their mandate.  Having worked as a public prosecutor 
for almost seven years, serving in more than seven Egyptian prosecutions dispersed across the 
                                                            
112 http://www.masrawy.com/News/Egypt/Politics/2012/november/2/5422001.aspx (Last visited Sep. 18, 2012).
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nation, helped me gain considerable insight in how the police functions and how its culture 
developed.
I believe the executive branch sought to dominate power through developing an entity whose 
loyalty was entirely directed towards the interests of the executive. Maintaining this loyalty was a 
matter of casting powers and privileges to the members of that entity and conditioning their 
persistence upon attaining the protected interests. That entity was the police. 
Empowering the police was not a matter of granting its members unequivocal legal 
competencies, but it was the fruit of a newly developed system totally outside the domain of law. It 
was an issue of expanding the involvement of the police in almost all daily dealings. Their severe 
involvement made it easier for police officers themselves to get their own business done by way of a 
phone call to their fellow officers in charge. Likewise, it became feasible for a police officer to 
facilitate a lot of governmental procedures for relatives, friends, or neighbours out of favour. Being 
close to police officers became a personal gain and that added to their own prestigious position.
On the other side, ordinary citizens usually face numerous difficulties when trying to get the
simplest business done. The difficulties range from facing bad treatment to arbitrary refusal of 
legitimate requests. However, this is not the case for a police officer or his relatives.                                                           
Although the monetary element was not among the granted privileges, those already granted 
were sufficient to maintain the desired loyalty. This is because the newly developed culture made it 
the ultimate goal for a person to protect his or her dignity. People do not want to be maltreated 
whenever they deal with an official or to be exceeded when they are in a queue by a person who has 
connections with those in charge. But since it was impossible to avoid these violations, people had 
either to surrender to this fact or, alternatively, get closer to the privileged entity, the police.
Getting closer can be through developing connections with police officers or even by trying to 
join the career. The latter option entailed citizens’ paying huge sums of money to whomever
claimed an ability to gain the necessary influence among decision-makers.
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On the one hand, those who dream about getting closer to the police know by heart what that 
entails; they know the underlying requirement of absolute loyalty to the executive, being aggressive 
towards fellow citizens, and obeying every order even if it was unlawful such as torturing, vote
rigging, and in some extreme instances, murdering.113 This automatic adaptation to the new culture
may be attributed to the diffused fear as observed by Laith Saud:
When watching World War II films, I find myself curious as to why 
someone would “hail Hitler” or applaud Mussolini, let alone commit acts 
of political murder or genocide in the name of the state. The enthusiasm 
behind such fascist demonstrations or actions is of course alarming. It 
proves just how easily men can submit themselves to committing atrocities 
against their fellow men. Such commitments can be explained simply by 
fear. Human beings fear reprisal from the state, therefore they submit to 
authoritarianism and even carry out violent acts against their own people 
or others out of such fear.114
On the other hand, the executive did not close the door of hope before all ranks of society to join 
such a career; limiting that ambition to a certain rank would have entailed suffering the discontent of 
those who would never be able to join them. Such a feeling would have isolated the police in a way 
that would have made it easier to expose them as an isolated entity to revolt against. Therefore, 
joining the career was not limited to secondary degree holders; room was made for lower ranks such 
as primary degree holders or even illiterates. This was achieved through creating a senior level of 
police officers available for secondary degree holders, and developing an inferior layer of lower-
class personnel known as ʾumanāʾ starting from the 1970s.115   Consequently, that entity succeeded in 
penetrating the society and minimizing chances of being revolted against.
In that sense, being a member of the police force was being a man who is being serviced rather 
than servicing. That has become a destination for all those who sought to be respected in society. 
The situation became more acute as people bear no respect for the educated; manifested respect 
became only to those who are competent to harm others with a decision or a phone call. However, 
people born to the said group concealed hatred, especially those who were not able either to join the 
police or to avoid their oppression without due flattering.
The job of the police became more like a box-ticking issue. No actual effort is being paid in 
tracing criminals or securing society. That was due to a newly developed culture of “effort-based 
                                                            
113See http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/28/egypt-police-brutality-torture-wikileaks (last visited Dec. 
2012).
114 Supra note 18, at 189. 
115 See http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/behind-lawlessness (last visited Dec. 2012). 
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system” as a measure of a police officer’s effort. According to this system, an officer’s effort is 
evaluated in accordance with the number of reports he writes. Such evaluation is conducted twice a 
year. More reports indicates more effort. Competition in that respect was through assigning the 
lower level inspectors the job of making reports and handing them in to a senior police officer who 
distributes them among his fellow officers each of whom signs a number of reports as his own work. 
On the other hand, the new mission assigned to the inspectors helped them to seize power in their 
neighbourhoods as their powers elevated them to that of a police officer. Furthermore, they became 
much more powerful as their reports are ultimately attributed to a police officer once he signs them 
and assumes responsibility. 
Real investigation became limited only to cases of public interest such as murder. Moreover, 
their actual job became protecting all the interests of the presidency starting from securing 
processions and ending with arresting the opposition. This new task assigned to the police has its 
origins in the period between the 1950s and 1960s when Gamāl ʿAbdel-Nasser “still found logic in 
turning the police on his own people if it seemed such people were opposed to the revolution or the 
natural progress of Egypt.”116
The deviation from the rule of law is reflected in the judicial system. Generally, police officers 
can be complained against either via a devoted inquisitorial body in the Ministry of Interior or before 
the public prosecution. Strengthening the alliance between the police and the presidency 
necessitated weakening censorship on their performance. The weakening strategy has been 
approached through neglecting mandates of the prosecution and by not responding to their calls for 
investigation. In that sense, the investigative power of the prosecution has been severely weakened. 
Public prosecutors have become unable to issue warrants of arrest as they will not be executed. 
They further have to make phone calls on their own expense to witnesses, or even convicted people, 
to call them in for investigation. 
At the time when oppression and injustice were at their peaks in Egypt, a judicial reform 
movement, starting in the mid 2000’s, provided people with hope. The 2005 judicial reform 
movement has been an important mark in Egyptian history, not only on the judicial side, but also on 
the cultural side. In 2005, a group of Egyptian judges started what was called the reform movement. 
This group of judges took a stance against the forging of results of the 2005 elections. The Mekky 
                                                            
116 Id. at 189-190. 
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brothers in 2005 and 2006 led demonstrations denouncing the forging of the elections.117 This 
movement was an important catalyst for the civil society movement that prompted Mubarak’s ouster 
in 2011. 
The executive branch, namely the presidency, was not fond of this movement. Tension escalated 
between this movement and the executive. The presidency tried to exert more control over the 
judicial branch; for instance, the president abandoned the practice of appointing the most senior 
judge as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional court, and instead brought judges from 
outside this court to keep it under control.118  The presidency took further measures against the whole 
judicial branch as a result of this movement. While these measures strengthened the position of the
reform judges, they made other judges, who were not keen on confrontation with the presidency, to 
detest everything that this movement represented. Consequently, this group of reform judges lost in 
the elections at the Judges Club. 
2. Revolutionary Moments:
In January 2011, Egyptians revolted against police brutality and social injustice. Although a lot 
of injuries and deaths have occurred amongst protesters, 119 the peacefulness of the revolution 
succeeded in altering “the grandstanding of Western politicians for whom “freedom” only followed 
bombs.”120
During and right after the revolution, people had a moment of reclaiming their dignity outside 
the grip of the police and the presidency. For a period of time, people actually reclaimed power.
When people had the actual authority in the streets, when everyone stood next to one another, and 
everyone had a specific role in protecting their neighbourhoods, this was the moment when people 
saw the culture of fear dying and a new culture of dignity arising. Most people when asked about 
these days, speak about them fondly, and express how at these moments everyone was respectful of
one another. 
                                                            
117 Mahmoud Mekky: VP Rose to Prominence Advocating Judicial Reform, 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/mahmoud-mekky-vp-rose-prominence-advocating-judicial-reform (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2012).
118 Nathan Brown, Egypt's Judges in a Revolutionary Age,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_judiciary.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
119 “According to the Ministry of Health, 840 Egyptians died and 6,467 were wounded during police repression of 
the protests from 25 to 28 January 2011 and in attacks up until 11 February by baltagiyya, or ‘thugs,’ known to have 
been hired by State Security.” See Reem Abou-El-Fadl, Beyond Conventional Transitional Justice: Egypt’s 2011 Revolution 
and the Absence of Political Will, 6 IJTJ 318–330,  324 (2012).
120 Supra note 18, at 188.
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Unfortunately, this spirit faded away shortly after the ousting of Mubarak. People went back to 
submitting to another coercive power, which was the SCAF. While many analysts claim that 
SCAF’s taking over the country was a necessity to insure stability, it made no sense to turn over 
authority to a power that ran under the same coercive philosophy. The key aspect to identify here is 
the fact that the rule of coercion was not yet replaced by the rule of law.
3. Injustice and the Persistence of Coercion:
It is evident that injustice in the Egyptian society is still prevalent. For instance, Petr Lom the 
director of the documentary “Back to the Square” remarked in his post-revolution documentary, “As 
I collected stories it was clearer and clearer that there was a continuing injustice and lack of human 
rights that seemed to be the most urgent thing to be tackled."121 The absence of the rule of law has 
further exacerbated the situation after the revolution as many incidents took place where people were 
killed without proper investigation. 
Most jarringly, institutions such as the police and prisons function in the 
same way as they did under Mubarak. New developments have been the 
unprecedentedly high number of military trials, with 12,000 civilians 
referred since February 2011. The SCAF’s only response to the public 
outcry and the ‘No to Military Trials Campaign’ was to pardon 2,000 
prisoners ahead of the 25 January 2012 marches. Meanwhile, military police 
have participated in violently crushing demonstrations. Amongst the most 
brutal was the crackdown at Maspero on 9 October 2011, in which more 
than 20 (mostly Coptic) Egyptians died while protesting the burning of 
churches by extremists. There have also been cases of fatal torture in jail, 
such as that of Essam Atta, who died in September 2011,34 and of cover-up 
tactics preserved from Mubarak’s era. The autopsies of both Atta and 
activist Khalid Said, killed by police in 2010, recorded their deaths as 
caused by swallowing a bag of drugs. 122
This situation was described by Egyptian political, labour and human rights activists and scholars as 
an experience of “obscure continuities of violence and exclusion.”123
Unsurprisingly, the perpetrators remain unknown. 
                                                            
121Catriona Davies, Victims of Injustice in Post-revolution Egypt Speak out,
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/17/world/meast/egypt-back-to-the-square-film/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 
2012).
122Supra note 113, at 328.
123Id. at 326.
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Although activists, legal scholars and judges affirm that “there [was] no political will on the part 
of the SCAF ... ‘to put the real perpetrators of violence behind bars,’”124 there has been another major 
reason that lies in the weakness of the investigative authority, which is a part of the Egyptian judicial 
system, before and after the revolution. 
After the military attacks on the revolutionaries, on March 9th, 2012, detaining and torturing 
many, it was apparent that the old ideology of rule still prevailed. The majority of people being pro 
instant stability submitted to the rule of the SCAF, and wanted to see the return of “security” in the 
Egyptian street. In this sense, a reproduction of the culture of fear and coercion was again seen in
Egyptian society, but this time it was even worse. If we consider this coercive power as a currency 
for authority, we can see that the same currency is still being exchanged. While during Mubarak’s
days this coercive power was centralized, now it became dispersed in the hands of many. What we 
have failed to realize is that we do not need to redistribute the old currency of authority, we need to 
change it. Applying Sharīʿa in that sense would not provide the solution as no methodology, 
whether that of Sharīʿa or of another ideology, would pay off in the absence of the rule of law. The 
rule of law needs to be the new currency for authority in Egypt; it needs to replace the culture of fear 
and coercion. 
The abolition of fear needs to be not only among citizens, I believe it must also be among 
intellectuals upon whose thoughts societies develop. Unfortunately, a freedom of conscience in 
Egypt suffers a severe deficit that is discussed in the following part.
B. Freedom of Conscience:
It is almost universally agreed amongst all trends of Islamists, whether fundamentalists or 
liberals, that Sharīʿa is applicable to all places and times. Although there are some other secular 
trends that refute such a contention, these trends are not of concern in this discussion as our main 
concern is freedom of conscience amongst Islamists. 
For Islamists, although Sharīʿa is applicable to all times and places, I argue that the 
fundamentalist group’s discourse contradicts their own belief. To clarify, the belief that Sharīʿa is 
applicable to all times and places entails another, indispensible belief that Sharīʿa is applicable to the 
sciences known in these times and places. For the greatest Islamic scholars (ʿUlamaʾ) known during 
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and right after the prophet Muhammad, for a person to perform discretion, ijtihad, a set of sciences 
must be born by this person such as prophetic sayings (Hadīth) and the rules of Arabic language. 
These sciences were only those sciences that were known at the time these scholars lived. However, 
those scholars limited the right to discretion to those who existed during their times, who necessarily 
born only the sciences known at their time, and deprived any other scholar of the same right by 
declaring the closure of the gate of ijtihad.125 Surprisingly, those scholars still believe that their 
sciences are sufficient to interpret the Qurʾan which is applicable, as they believe, to ages they would 
not had witnessed. More surprisingly, modern fundamentalists share the same view as their ancestors 
although they have seen with their very eyes the contributions of modern science to the world today.
They did not justify neglecting the incorporation of modern science in interpreting texts that are 
applicable to the time and place these sciences emerged. In this regard, the fundamentalists’ 
approach contradicts their own belief that Shari’s is applicable to all times and places.
Neglecting modernity and adhering exclusively to ancestors’ discretion created “[t]ension
between Islamic fundamentalists and liberal Muslim intellectuals [which] is as old as the beginning 
of modernization in the Muslim world.”126
While liberals, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ʿAbduh, and their disciples, 
attempted to modernize Islam and “to reconcile their religion with the modern world,” 
fundamentalists “[sought] to Islamize the modern age, calling for a return to pristine Islam.”127
Examples of modern liberal intellectuals include Farag Foda and Nasr Hamid Abū Zayd “who 
have paid a heavy price for their outspokenness, have waged a war against the 'obscurantist' ideas 
and schemes of the Islamists, stressing Islam's compatibility with modern civilization.”128
The instance of Nasr Hamid Abū Zayd is an unprecedented instance as “[n]ever before has an 
Egyptian court ruled that a husband must be separated from his wife on grounds of apostasy.”129
Abū Zayd was an Egyptian scholar, a Professor of Islamic and Arabic Studies at Cairo 
University, who “. . . [did] not regard the heritage as sacred, inasmuch as it is human thought 
regarding religion. It stands for development, and embraces the future.”130
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Abū Zayd differentiated between Islam as a religion, which is sacred, and Islamic thought 
reflected in Sharīʿa which is subject to discretion. The argument referred to Sharīʿa as “human 
interpretations and applications of fixed religious principles in accordance with changing 
circumstances, and therefore can now be changed, contrary to the Islamists' claim that they are 
divinely-ordained and immutable, valid for all times and places.”131
On June 14, 1995, legal proceedings were initiated against Abu Zayd in which occasion: 
Cairo's Appeals Court ruled that Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd ... was an apostate 
from Islam, and ordered his separation from his wife. The court based its 
decision, later upheld by the Supreme Court, on its interpretation that the 
principle of ḥisba is applicable in matters of personal status. Ḥisba is based 
on the Qurʾanic verses entrusting Muslims with the collective obligation to 
encourage good and discourage evil. In his books and articles, Abū Zayd, a 
liberal-secularist writer, extended his linguistic research to the study of 
Islamic texts, in particular the Qurʾan and the Sunna, thereby infurating the 
Islamists, who charged him with blaspheming Islam, and demeaning 
Islamic ʿUlamāʾ, past and present... The rejection of Abū Zayd's promotion 
at the University, the court decision, and his self-exile in Europe, fearing 
for his life, are evidence that the influence of the Islamists has extended 
beyond preaching into the Academy and the Judiciary, to the detriment of 
scientific research, freedom of thought and expression, and social and 
economic progress.132
Moreover, “The Jihād, a radical Islamist organization, called for his death, so did Aymān al-
Ẓawāhirī, one of the leaders of al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya...”133
As argued by the lawyer Khalil ʿAbd al-Karīm, the court exceeded its mandate as it “had no 
jurisdiction over whether a citizen is or is not a Muslim.”134
Abū Zayd's offence was that he incorporated his linguistic experience in the study of Islamic 
texts. (199) The fact that Abū Zayd “has used reason and free thinking, and exercised ijtihād in an
age that rejects ijtihād”135 entitled the court to rule on his own belief even with his assertion that he 
still believed in Islam. For most of the enlightened Egyptian intellectuals, the case of Abū Zayd was 
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a modern form of an inquisition similar to that of the European Church under the Romanian 
Empire.136
A similar approach was pursued against ʿAli ʿAbd El-Razeq, a judge and Azharite scholar, 
regarding his publication Islam and the Essences of Governance (Al-Islam wa Ūsūl Al-Hukm). In his 
book, Abd El-Razeq asserted the exclusion of the Caliphate from the essence of Islam and from 
belief. This opinion was heavily criticized by Rashid Reda who later accused Abd El-Razeq of being 
an apostate from Islam. On August 12, 1925, the Institute of Senior Azharite ʿUlamaʾ convened and 
accused Abd El-Razeq of believing in distorted ideas. The decision of this institute was not 
appealable and included excluding Abd El-Razeq from the ʿUlamaʾ group among other coercive 
sanctions.
Not only has a culture similar to the inquisition emerged in Egyptian society, but also a trend of 
priesthood has been adopted by modern fundamentalists. The Islamic priesthood can be traced back 
to the Charter of Al-Azhar in June 2011 in which Al-Azhar tried to preserve for itself the exclusive 
right to understand and interpret what is agreed upon among Islamic ʿUlamaʾ. Al-Azhar justified this 
authority given its nature as an institution to which reference is made to Islamic matters, sciences, 
heritage, and modern jurisprudential and intellectual discretion.137
The granted exclusivity of understanding Sharīʿa is an alien phenomenon to the Islamic discourse 
as paradoxically highlighted at the outset of the same Charter. I perceive such exclusivity as the 
essence of the modern Islamic priesthood.
From the discussed examples, it is evident that fundamentalists in Egypt are extremely
influential in the political, academic and cultural spheres. That influence triggers suspicions 
regarding any attempt to apply Sharīʿa. This is mainly because of the indefinite nature of Sharīʿa as a 
set of inconsistent jurisprudential opinions harmonization of which necessitates ijtihād. But in light of 
the role fundamentalists play in intimidating mujtahids, the prospective Sharīʿa to be applied under 
such conditions would be probably one that is concluded with rational apathy, one that lacks 
adaptability to reality and demands of the modern age.
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V. Conclusion:
The problem of realizing any actual reform has been the lack of investing in momentum created 
by a spark of hope. If the Egyptian revolution needs to learn anything, it is the fact that momentum is 
extremely important to harnes, especially if the envisioned reforms already have a critical mass of 
support. 
The proposed follow-up actions need a vision, one that entails the rule of law at its heart. This is 
why the MB need to get rid of any concealed visions, if they bear any, and rally people around a 
common vision, which can be the driver for this country. 
The MB’s claiming to apply Sharīʿa might be one step towards the rule of law; however, such a 
claim is not in and of itself a guarantee of achieving that end. Although Sharīʿa is meant to be an 
applicable methodology that governs the legal system of the state, Sharīʿa is only a substance that 
needs an overarching mechanism for it to be accurately applied. This mechanism is the rule of law.
Having accurately applied Sharīʿa, I believe that it would effectively defy autocracy and 
dictatorship. It would be in this regard even more effective than the common democratic systems as 
it handles most of the deficiencies of democracy.  Such advantages are not even undermined by the 
indefinite nature of Sharīʿa rules; Sharīʿa would still be applicable and adaptable to modern age as 
long as reconciling these rules with modern issues is approached through ijtihād.
Yet, the mechanism needed to apply Sharīʿa, which is the rule of law, is not of lesser importance.
For Sharīʿa, or any other methodology, to govern, the law must initially rule the society. 
Unfortunately, this has not been the situation in Egypt either before or after the revolution of January 
2011. The actual ruler in Egypt has long been the culture of fear, a culture that has been jointly and 
equally developed by the police and fundamentalist Islamists. 
I believe that no law, whether Islamic or secular, can succeed in promoting its ideology as long 
as the society is not ruled by law. For Islamists to apply Sharīʿa as they claim, society must be ruled 
by law rather than the culture of fear.
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